

Preliminary Program of the Conference on

**Matching Market Design:
Strategy-Proofness and Beyond**

July 13–14, 2023

Hosted and organized by the WZB Berlin Social Science Center

The conference is supported by grants from the
CRC TRR 190, BSE Insights, and the BCCP


Organizers:

Christian Basteck

Dorothea Kübler

Vincent Meisner (TU)

Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)



Thursday, July 13, 2023

9.00–9.30 **Registration**
Workshop Opening

9.30–10.40 **1st Session: Chair: Renke Schmacker**

Alex Rees-Jones (University of Pennsylvania)

[Behavioral Economics in Education Market Design: A Forward-Looking Review](#)

Camille Terrier (Queen Mary University of London):

[From Immediate Acceptance to Deferred Acceptance: Effects on School Admissions and Achievement in England](#)

10.40–11.00 Coffee Break

11.00–12.10 **2nd Session Chair: Soo Hong Chew**

Yuki Tamura (NYU Abu Dhabi):

“A Characterization of Obviously Strategy-proof Rules for Object Reallocation Problems with Single-peaked Preferences”

Yannai Gonczarowski (Harvard University):

[Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms](#)

12.10–13.00 Lunch Break

13.00–14.10 **3rd Session Chair: Vincent Meisner**


Ofer Glicksohn (Hebrew University of Jerusalem):

[Deferred Acceptance with News Utility](#)

Peter Katuscak (RWTH Aachen University):

“Do People Misreport in Strategy-Proof Mechanisms to Avoid Disappointment?”

14.10–14.50 Poster Session & Coffee Break



14.50–16.35 4th Session Chair: Bnaya Dreyfuss

Markus Möller (University of Bonn):

[Transparent Matching Mechanisms](#)

Clayton Thomas (Princeton University):

[Strategyproofness-Exposing Mechanism Descriptions](#)

Ori Heffetz (Cornell University):

“Explaining Deferred Acceptance to Participants:
Experimental Analysis”

17.00 Neue Nationalgalerie – Gerhard Richter

19.00 *Conference Dinner. By Invitation Only*

Friday, July 14, 2023

9.30–10.40 1st Session: Chair: Paul Rosmer

Timm Opitz (Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition):

[Everyone Likes to be Liked: Experimental Evidence from Matching Markets](#)

Peter Troyan (University of Virginia):


“Rankings-Dependent Preferences: A Real Goods Matching Experiment”

10.40–11.10 Coffee Break

11.10–12.55 2nd Session: Chair: Jinju Rhee

Anna Bogomolnaia (University of Glasgow):

“The competitive solution to congested assignment”



Christian Basteck (WZB):

“On the Constrained Efficiency of Strategy-proof Random Assignment”

Lars Ehlers (University of Montreal):

“Existence of Myopic-Farsighted Stable Sets in Matching Markets”

12.55–13.45 *Lunch Break*

13.45–15.30 **3rd Session: Chair: Lawrence Choo**

Ran Shorrer (Penn State):

“Too good to be true? Explaining the rank distribution puzzle in matching markets”

Li Chen (University of Gothenburg):

[Respecting Priorities Versus Respecting Preferences in School Choice: When is There a Trade-off?](#)

Inacio Bo (University of Macau):

“Incontestable Mechanisms”

15.30–16.00 Coffee Break

16.00–17.45 **4th Session: Chair: Georgy Artemov**

Aytek Erdil (University of Cambridge):

[Widening Access in University Admissions](#)

Irene Lo (Stanford University):

“Designing School Choice for Diversity in the San Francisco Unified School District”

Rustamdjan Hakimov (University of Lausanne):

[Confidence and College Applications: Evidence from a Randomized Intervention](#)

17.45–17.50 **Closing Remarks**

18.45 *Conference Dinner. By Invitation Only*

(Changes updated July 12)

